



Checklists of Foreign Countries Subject to Sanctions

 THOMPSON
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About the Firm

Thompson Coburn LLP's International Trade attorneys counsel clients in the legal aspects of shipping goods, services and technologies across international borders. We regularly advise clients on customs compliance and export controls, foreign investment, international finance, immigration and the protection of intellectual property rights. Our attorneys regularly represent clients before the related agencies under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Department of State, as well as the U.S. International

Trade Commission, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Congress and international bodies.

Since the firm's founding in 1929, we have represented clients from nearly every industrial and corporate sector, including energy, banking, transportation, manufacturing and communications. Now, with more than 380 attorneys and 50 practice areas, we continue to serve clients throughout the United States and abroad.

Countries Subject to Various Restrictions by the U.S., EU, and UN

The following are checklists of countries that are subject to a variety of U.S. and EU-imposed restrictions affecting international trade. The countries are grouped into different categories based upon their nature; several of the countries are subject to more than one category of restriction. Although there is considerable overlap between the U.S. and EU checklists, the restrictions applicable to a particular country may differ significantly. The UK recently withdrew from the EU and has adopted its own independent trade restrictions programs. Explanatory notes following the two checklists describe the different categories of restrictions for each.

The last page describes sanctions mandated by UN Security Council resolutions and also sets forth information regarding sanctions implemented by certain other countries.

Please note: *The attached checklists are intended to alert users to possible issues involving transactions with the named countries or designated persons. They are not intended to constitute, or substitute for, legal advice. Because sanctions programs are subject to change, it is important to review, in advance, any planned dealings with sanctioned countries or persons.*

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Jim advises domestic, foreign and multinational clients in an array of industries, including aerospace, biomedicine, financial services, manufacturing and telecommunications with regard to international trade compliance and enforcement matters arising under international sanctions, the ITAR, the EAR, the FCPA and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. process.

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Jonathan's practice focuses on international and domestic maritime and shipping matters, including trade sanctions and other regulations affecting the global movement of goods and commodities. Much of his work in the international trade area has arisen from marine insurance issues. Jon is an experienced litigator at all levels of the federal court system.

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
Evelyn advocates for clients in litigation and administrative matters involving the federal government – including fraud investigations and administrative proceedings. She draws on her experience working with government agencies to guide clients through complex issues. Evelyn supports a number of trade matters through legal research, drafting pleadings and memoranda, supporting case management, conducting document reviews, and assisting with client communications.

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Catherine researches and prepares filings and responses to U.S. government requests pertaining to the entry of goods into the United States, including protests, disclosures and responses to requests for information from CBP on behalf of importers. Catherine is experienced in the classification of goods under the HTSUS, the qualification of goods for preferential treatment under trade preference programs, and the application of Section 301 and the Section 301 exclusion process.

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Ronen is an International Trade Specialist who supports attorneys on import and export trade issues, sanctions matters, and general customs compliance. Ronen performs detailed

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Sanctions and Export Control News

<p>March 2, 2021</p>	<p>The U.S. State Department, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), announced the addition of Russia to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations' (ITAR) "Section 126.1" list of proscribed countries. This effectively makes Russia subject to a U.S. arms embargo by changing the license policy for most ITAR-controlled articles and services to a presumption of denial, although it provided a limited exception for joint space related items. The U.S. Departments of State and Treasury also imposed targeted sanctions on a number of Russian entities and persons involved in the poisoning and imprisonment of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, or otherwise supporting the Russian Federation's proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.</p>
<p>February 24, 2021</p>	<p>The EU announced it would impose asset freeze and travel ban sanctions on individuals involved in detaining and punishing Alexei Navalny under a new Global Human Rights sanctions regime in the first such use of the regime, previously adopted December 7, 2020, in Council Regulation 2020/1998 and Council Decision 2020/1999.</p>
<p>February 18, 2021</p>	<p>Representatives from the US, France, Germany, and the UK released a joint statement calling for the resumption of the Iran nuclear deal via Iran's return to compliance and the lifting of U.S. sanctions reimposed during the Trump Administration.</p>
<p>February 10, 2021</p>	<p>The Biden Administration issued Executive Order 14014, "Blocking Property with Respect to the Situation in Burma" in response to the February 1, 2021, military overthrow of the democratically-elected government officials of Burma. The EO blocked "all property and interests in property" in the United States or in control of a United States person of a variety of foreign persons, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, to be involved in the coup through a number of means defined by the Order. The EO also targets persons operating in the defense sector of the Burmese economy for sanctions. In conjunction with this Executive Order, the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added eight foreign persons and three foreign entities to the SDN list.</p>
<p>January 19, 2021</p>	<p>The U.S. listed the Fortuna vessel, a Russian pipe-laying ship assisting in the production of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as well as the ship's owner, KVT-RUS, on OFAC's SDN list. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is being produced to carry gas from Russia to Europe, and has been viewed by the U.S. as a means for Russia to gain political power throughout Europe.</p>
<p>January 12, 2021</p>	<p>The U.S. Department of State re-designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST)--Cuba had previously been removed as an SST in 2015 by the Obama Administration. As an SST, Cuba faces a number of sanctions, including "restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions."</p>

January 1, 2021	The UK formally ended its implementation of EU sanctions. New UK sanctions regulations in force under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2018 establish autonomous UK sanctions regimes, applying to the entire UK. While similar to the previous sanctions structure, the new UK regime does not overlap perfectly with the EU's sanctions programs.
December 18, 2020	EU Council Implementing Regulation 2020/2129 and Council Implementing Decision 2020/2130 imposed sanctions (including asset freezes and travel bans) against 29 individuals and seven entities in Belarus following that government's violent response to pro-democratic protesters. Previously, in November 2020, the EU adopted Council Implementing Regulation 2020/1648 and Council Implementing Decision 2020/1650, which added Alexandr Lukashenko and other regime officials to its Belarus sanctions lists.
December 14, 2020	The U.S. Department of State officially removed Sudan from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Sudan was listed as an SST since 1993, and the move will pave the way for greater collaboration and decreased restrictions on transactions involving Sudan.
November 12, 2020	President Trump issued Executive Order 13959, Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies. Effective January 11, 2021, the Order restricts the purchase of publicly traded securities, as well as derivative securities or others "designed to provide investment exposure to [the] securities" of any "Communist Chinese Military Company," as defined by the Order. The Order also provided a divestment period for those holding such securities. The Order was imposed to prevent inadvertent U.S. funding of China's military and "national strategy of Military-Civil Fusion."
October 6, 2020	The EU commission announced two new online platforms to assist small and medium-sized enterprises in performing due diligence for transactions involving Iran. The platforms help identify business projects, entities, or individuals noncompliant with EU sanctions.
October 1, 2020	OFAC published a "Ransomware Advisory" alerting companies to the potential sanctions enforcement risk of paying or facilitating ransom payments, including for companies doing business with victims of ransomware attacks. Given sanctions in place on many "malicious cyber actors" that may be involved in ransomware attacks, OFAC outlined the national security risks that could arise from paying a ransom. In addition, OFAC described actions companies should take to minimize violation enforcement risks.
July 31, 2020	OFAC designated a major Chinese government entity, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), as well as two former/current officials with the XPCC, for their involvement in serious human rights abuses against ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region. The XPCC is a quasi-governmental entity with hundreds of subsidiaries and a massive presence in the everyday life of millions of persons in the Xinjiang region.

Sanctions and Export Control News

July 31, 2020	BIS amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to suspend a long list of available license exceptions for exports and reexports to, and transfers within, Hong Kong. The suspension of these exceptions removes differences between the treatment of Hong Kong and China following the termination of Hong Kong's special trade status. The suspensions included license exception Additional Permissive Reexports, Shipments of Limited Value, Shipments to Group B Countries, and more.
July 28, 2020	The EU imposed restrictions barring the export of equipment or technology that can facilitate internal repression, intercept communications or other surveillance-related technology to Hong Kong following months of protests and Chinese reprisals.
July 14, 2020	President Trump signed into law the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA) (P.L. 116-149), authorizing the review and imposition of sanctions on foreign persons determined to be responsible for undermining Hong Kong's autonomy from China.
July 14, 2020	President Trump issued Executive Order 13936, terminating Hong Kong's special trade status in response to Hong Kong's diminishing autonomy from China.
June 29, 2020	Effective June 29, 2020, BIS eliminated license exception Civil End Users (CIV) (EAR § 740.5). CIV previously authorized exports, reexports, or in-country transfers of some national security-controlled items without a license to civil end users for civil end uses in Country Group D:1 countries. BIS again cited civil and military integration as a key concern driving the removal of the license exception.
June 29, 2020	Effective June 29, 2020, BIS expanded 15 C.F.R. § 744.21 of the EAR (which required a license for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of items classified in ECCNs provided for in Supplement No. 2, Part 744 of the EAR if the exporter had "knowledge" that the item is intended for military end uses in China, or military end users or end uses in Russia or Venezuela). The new rule requires a license for both military end uses AND military end users in China, and further expanded the definition of "military end use" to include "any item that supports or contributes to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, 'development' or 'production' of military items." These changes expanded the types of products that may require a license to include anything tangentially serving a military purpose.
June 17, 2020	President Trump signed into law the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-145). The Act requires the review, reporting to Congress, and subsequent imposition of sanctions on foreign persons and entities determined to be responsible for the human rights abuses occurring in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region of China.

<p>May 15, 2020</p>	<p>The Foreign Direct Product Rule was significantly expanded on May 15, 2020 (as further clarified August 17, 2020). The revisions expanded the Rule with the addition of new, independent means for controlling foreign-produced goods by the addition of footnote 1 to Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the EAR (the Entity List). The new rule imposes license requirements for reexports, exports from abroad, or transfers, of certain foreign-produced items (including products that are the direct product of technology or software subject to the EAR or produced by a plant or on equipment that is the direct product of technology or software subject to the EAR), classified in specified ECCNs, when the exporter has "knowledge that either the foreign-produced item will be incorporated into, or that the foreign-produced item will be used in the 'production' or 'development' of any 'part,' 'component,' or 'equipment' produced, purchased, or ordered by any entity with a footnote 1 designation [in Supp. No. 4 to Part 744]...or when any entity with a footnote 1 designation...is a party to any transaction involving the foreign-produced item...." 85 Fed. Reg. 51596 (August 20, 2020). This targeted Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. entities, as well as various non-U.S. affiliates listed at footnote 1.</p>
<p>May 7, 2020</p>	<p>The European Commission (EC) published an Action Plan to address additional actions to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing. The plan included a proposal to create a central body to coordinate and support member country financial intelligence units and updated the list of "high-risk" countries for AML compliance.</p>
<p>February 24, 2020</p>	<p>The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to revise certain Country Group designations for the Russian Federation and Yemen. Of particular note, the changes give less favorable treatment of exports to Russia by moving Russia to Country Groups D:2 and D:4 in Supplement No. 1 to Part 740, adding it to the NP1 control in Supplement No. 1 to Part 738, and removing Russia from the A groups due to increased nuclear and missile technology proliferation concerns. The BIS licensing policy also changed to a policy of presumption of denial for the export of items to Russia when such items are controlled for CB, NP, or MT reasons. These changes will make a variety of dual-use technologies more difficult to export to Russia, and take immediate effect.</p>
<p>January 31, 2020</p>	<p>January 31 marked the legal separation of the United Kingdom from the European Union. A transition period will bridge the gap between the separation date and full wind-down in December 2020. The full picture of what the commercial relationship between the UK and the EU will entail is not yet clear, but may begin to come into focus over the course of the year. In the meantime, the UK will abide by the EU rules, including sanctions programs. Eventually, UK sanctions could diverge more markedly from the EU regime.</p>

Sanctions and Export Control News

January 14, 2020	The "E3" (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered a dispute resolution procedure within the JCPOA after Iran announced that it would not observe its obligations under the JCPOA, specifically regarding the number of centrifuges and the extent of uranium enrichment it would pursue. The development is the latest in a string of actions that threatens to entirely unwind the international agreement that limited Iran's ability to acquire materials for nuclear weapons.
January 13, 2020	President Trump signed an Executive Order adding Iranian construction, mining, manufacturing, metals, and textile industries to the sectors that carry both primary and secondary sanctions consequences for U.S. and non-U.S. persons, respectively. In coordination, OFAC sanctioned several large producers of iron, steel, aluminum, and copper in Iran. These actions collectively increased the risk for companies, especially non-U.S. companies, doing business with major sectors of the Iranian economy, and comes at a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran.
December 21, 2019	The United States signed into law targeted restrictions on persons supporting the Nord Stream 2 oil pipeline from Russia to Germany. The sanctions mostly target civil engineering and companies that have sold, leased, or "provided" vessels contracted to finish laying the undersea pipeline.
December 10, 2019	OFAC announced two settlements with global insurers for alleged violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR). Of note, the agency considered obedience of the EU blocking regulation at the expense of following OFAC prohibitions on dealings with Cuba to be an aggravating factor in the settlement.
December 9, 2019	The EU began development of a Magnitsky-style human rights violators list. The EU envisions it as a flexible, "global sanctions regime" to target a variety of abuses.
November 11, 2019	The EU Council renewed sanctions against dozens of Venezuelan government officials as well as an arms embargo on certain arms and equipment for the Maduro regime (Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074). The sanctions are in response to alleged human rights violations and other destabilizing actions taken by the regime in Venezuela.
October 17, 2019	The European Commission adopted an updated EU dual-use export control list (Annex 1 to Regulation (EC) 428/2009).
October 14, 2019	OFAC added Turkey's Ministry of National Defence and Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and several senior Turkish officials to the SDN list for its actions in support of the government of Turkey following the Turkish invasion of northern Syria. The designations were deleted nine days later on October 23 following a cease-fire agreement.

September 25, 2019	OFAC listed major Chinese shipper COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co. Ltd. and related companies as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) for allegedly transporting Iranian oil and other prohibited petroleum products. As a result of the designation and due to the wide scope of the Iran sanctions program, U.S. (via primary sanctions) and non-U.S. (via secondary sanctions) persons doing business with these entities became vulnerable to OFAC punishment. On January 31, 2020, OFAC deleted COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co. Ltd. and most of the other entities designated on September 25 from the SDN list. But the designation put many in the international shipping community on notice that the U.S. would not shy away from bold action in the implementation of the Iran sanctions program.
September 13, 2019	In <i>Lamesa Investments LTD v Cynergy Bank LTD</i> (2019) EWHC 1877 (Comm), the English Commercial Court interpreted the threat of U.S. secondary sanctions to constitute sufficient legal justification for withholding a payment “in order to comply with any mandatory provision of law, regulation or order of any court of competent jurisdiction.” While the decision is confined to the specific facts of that case, it could open the door to more frequent claims that observance of U.S. secondary sanctions permits exercise of sanctions or legal compliance clauses in a variety of financial and business settings in the UK.
September 6, 2019	The EU Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) extended sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for contributing to the territorial incursions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (original designation: Council Regulation (EU) 269/2014 and Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP).
August 6, 2019	The Trump Administration issued a new Executive Order blocking property of the Government of Venezuela for U.S. persons. The new prohibition is a steep escalation of consequences on the Maduro regime’s government, preventing U.S. companies and individuals from doing business with any government of Venezuela entity, official, or any entity owned 50% or greater by the government. The Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) simultaneously released 12 amended and 13 new general licenses to provide limited exceptions and wind down periods for certain conduct.
August 1, 2019	President Trump signed an Executive Order imposing bank loan sanctions related to Russia’s previous 2018 biological weapons attack on Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in the U.K. in 2018. The sanctions prohibit U.S. Bank participation involving certain non-ruble denominated bonds issued by and the lending of non-ruble denominated funds to the Russian sovereign.
July 15, 2019	The EU Council announced it has extended autonomous sanctions, including an asset freeze and travel ban restrictions, on certain DPRK individuals and entities. The action comes in response to continued threats posed by DPRK in the areas of nuclear weapons, other WMDs, and ballistic missiles.
June 24, 2019	President Trump issued Executive Order 13876, “Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Iran.” The Order blocked and sanctioned certain Iranian officials, including members of the Supreme Leader’s Office.

Sanctions and Export Control News

<p>June 21, 2019</p>	<p>The EU adopted Council Decision 2019/1018, extending restrictive measures imposed against Russia related to the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, until June 23, 2020. The EU Council condemned the Russian Federation's "illegal annexation" in its Council Decision, and reaffirmed its non-recognition policy.</p>
<p>June 18, 2019</p>	<p>The spokesperson for Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Behrouz Kamalvandi, announced that Iran would soon exceed the 300kg limit of uranium in its stockpile--a limit Iran agreed to under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 in exchange for sanctions relief. After the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sanctions against Iran, Iran sought the commitment of European signatories of the JCPOA to uphold the deal. While increasing uranium production, Iran called on the JCPOA's European signatories to take action to protect its interests.</p>
<p>June 13, 2019</p>	<p>Pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, OFAC published amended regulations adjusting maximum penalty amounts under OFAC regulations to account for inflation.</p> <p>The EU adopted Council Decision 2019/933 and published Regulation 2019/985 to revoke restrictive measures against the Republic of Maldives.</p>
<p>May 2, 2019</p>	<p>OFAC released a framework for organizations to use in the development of effective sanctions compliance programs (SCPs). The guidance from OFAC outlines the factors that it considers critical to an SCP that may be viewed favorably in the event of a violation, recommendations for developing effective SCPs, and typical reasons that SCPs may fail. The framework is useful for organizations to use as both a starting point, and a model when evaluating their own SCPs.</p> <p>The Council of the EU released a statement condemning the U.S. decision to no longer suspend Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. After referring to the decision as "contrary to international law," the EU indicated that it would respond appropriately to the action.</p>
<p>April 25, 2019</p>	<p>Canada amended its Special Economic Measures (Venezuela) Regulations in SOR/2019-106 to add 43 additional Venezuelans to the Schedule of listed persons for their ties to the Maduro regime.</p>
<p>April 24, 2019</p>	<p>President Trump announced eight oil-related Significant Reduction Exceptions, granted after the reimposition of sanctions on the Iranian energy sector in November 2018, would not be renewed after their six-month period expired. By allowing the waivers to expire, the Trump Administration intends to "bring Iran's oil exports to zero, denying the regime its principal source of revenue" in a manner that would impose "maximum pressure" on Iran.</p>
<p>April 17, 2019</p>	<p>Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the Trump Administration would no longer suspend Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. Title III allows U.S. citizens to sue anyone that traffics into the U.S. property that was expropriated from the citizen by the Cuban government. Title III was previously suspended by every presidential administration since the Act was signed in 1996.</p>

April 5, 2019	OFAC designated Balito Bay Shipping Incorporated and Proper In Management Incorporated, pursuant to EO 13850, for operations tied to the Venezuelan oil sector. In addition, OFAC designated a total of thirty-five vessels for ties to one of the entities or to Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA).
March 25, 2019	The U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), together with the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Coast Guard, issued an advisory warning of the high sanctions risks for parties involved in directly or indirectly providing petroleum to the Syrian government. In addition to outlining the various ways that an individual or entity could become sanctioned, OFAC highlighted red flags in high risk shipping transactions.
February 25, 2019	The EU adopted Council Decision 2019/325, extending restrictive measures against Belarus and four designated individuals until February 28, 2020.
February 4, 2019	The EU Council issued a press release stating, in part, that the EU remains committed to the JCPOA despite the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement in 2018. Iranian ballistic missile activity, and its support of disruptive non-state actors in Syria and Lebanon, among other locations, remain a concern to the EU Council.
January 28, 2019	The U.S. Department of Treasury announced a determination, made in conjunction with the State Department, that persons operating in Venezuela's oil sector are subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13850. In conjunction with this determination, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published new and amended general licenses related to conduct in Venezuela, and added Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) to the SDN list, significantly impacting the Venezuelan economy and, particularly, U.S. persons doing business with Venezuela's oil sector.
January 27, 2019	OFAC announced removals of three entities (EN+ Group PLC, JCS Eurosibenergo, and United Company RUSAL PLC), due to actions those company took to divest ownership from sanctioned Russian individuals. The removal of these SDNs at the same time as the expiration of certain general licenses to transact business with them triggered a reporting requirement for the applicable sanctions period.
December 21, 2018	The EU announced Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2078, extending its sanctions and restrictive measures targeting Russia for an additional six months.
November 27, 2018	President Trump signed EO 13851, blocking property of certain persons contributing to violence in Nicaragua. Two individuals were designated under the program.

Sanctions and Export Control News

November 4, 2018	As a consequence of President Trump's May 8, 2018, announcement of the discontinuation of U.S. participation in the JCPOA, the 180-day winddown period concluded, ending all remaining U.S. relief specified in the JCPOA, particularly such relief pertaining to sanctions on: Iran's port operators, shipbuilding, and shipping sectors; petroleum-related transactions, including those with NIOC, NICO, NITC, and including the purchase of petroleum and related products. Pre-JCPOA U.S. primary and secondary sanctions in these remaining areas now return into force. OFAC published additional FAQs related to the end of the 180-day wind-down period and the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions lifted or waived as part of the JCPOA. Over 700 persons were designated or identified and added to the SDN List, including persons who had been removed from the SDN List in connection with the JCPOA. Additionally, persons and associated blocked property previously identified on the EO 13599 List were been moved to the SDN List. The wind-down license for General License H also concluded.
October 25, 2018	OFAC designated Singapore-based Tan Wee Beng, Wee Tiong (S) Pte Ltd., and WT Marine Pte Ltd., pursuant to EO 13551, for activities including money laundering, counterfeiting of goods or currency, bulk cash smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and/or other illicit economic activity involving or supporting the Government of North Korea or its senior officials.
October 24, 2018	OFAC issued Belarus General License 2F, extending permission to transact with nine major Belarus state-owned entities (and their 50% or greater owned subsidiaries) until October 25, 2019. Transactions seeking cover from the General License must satisfy a reporting requirement with OFAC if the transaction exceeds \$50,000 (individually or in aggregate).
September 20, 2018	President Trump issued EO 13849, authorizing a menu of sanctions consequences related to the implementation of portions of CAATSA (specifically, sections 224(a)(2), 231(a), and 233(a)). OFAC issued additional Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions to supplement guidance on CAATSA and related implementation.
August 8, 2018	The U.S. State Department notified Congress of the United States's invocation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) sanctions on the Russian Federation for its use of chemical or biological weapons ("Novichok" nerve agent) in violation of international law against its own nationals. The sanctions include restrictions on foreign assistance, arms sales and related financing; denial of US government credit or financial assistance; and exports of national security-sensitive goods and technology. A second wave of sanctions, including a menu of six sanction options (of which the President must select three) that involve restrictions on multilateral development bank assistance, bank loans, further export restrictions, import restrictions, diplomatic relations, and commercial aviation, have yet to be invoked as of February 2019.

<p>August 6, 2018</p>	<p>As a consequence of President Trump’s May 8, 2018, announcement of the discontinuation of U.S. participation in the JCPOA, a 90-day wind-down period concluded, ending certain relief specified in the JCPOA pertaining to sanctions on: Iran’s trade in gold or precious metals; the direct or indirect supply of graphite, certain metals, or integrated industrial software; significant transactions related to Iranian Reals; the purchase or dealing in Iranian sovereign debt; and Iran’s automotive sector. Pre-JCPOA U.S. primary and secondary sanctions in these areas returned into force. The wind-down license for General License I also concluded.</p>
<p>July 19, 2018</p>	<p>OFAC issued an additional General License (No. 5) regarding certain PDVSA bond transactions in Venezuela and two additional FAQs regarding the scope of permissible conduct in Venezuela.</p>
<p>July 13, 2018</p>	<p>The Department of Commerce issued an order terminating the previous Denial Order, issued on April 15, 2018, against Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE) and ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications Ltd., ending a lengthy and high-profile violations case against the Chinese company. ZTE disclosed earlier in 2018 that it had made false statements to BIS, triggering the Denial Order in April. The parties subsequently agreed to enhanced settlement terms and a payment of over \$1 billion.</p>
<p>June 28, 2018</p>	<p>OFAC revoked Iran-related General Licenses H and I, which were originally issued in connection with the JCPOA. General License H authorized U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries to do business with Iran under specific circumstances. OFAC also amended the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (ITSR), in order to narrow the scope of certain general licenses. A brief wind-down period (August 6, 2018, for transactions previously authorized under General License I, and November 4, 2018, for transactions previously authorized under General License H) was announced to enable termination of Iranian activities. The U.S. has also suggested secondary sanctions on EU companies are a possibility following the expiration of any applicable wind-down periods.</p> <p>OFAC announced removal from the Code of Federal Regulations the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations as a result of executive actions earlier in the year.</p>
<p>May 8, 2018</p>	<p>President Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw from its participation in the JCPOA that lifted many international sanctions on Iran in exchange for a series of conditions limiting its ability to pursue a nuclear weapon. The decision means that U.S. sanctions on Iran that were lifted as part of the JCPOA will “snap back” into place following any applicable wind-down periods (90- and 180-day wind-down periods were announced for different activities), in addition to the sanctions that remained in force following the JCPOA implementation.</p>
<p>April 23, 2018</p>	<p>OFAC issued new and updated general licenses extending the wind-down license for a subset of the April 6 designated Russian entities, along with several additional FAQs regarding the affected or designated entities.</p>

Sanctions and Export Control News

April 6, 2018	OFAC designated a number of Russian individuals and entities, including several prominent oligarchs with large investment portfolios and ownership interests in major global organizations. OFAC also issued several new FAQs and general licenses to permit the maintenance and wind-down of activities with affected or designated entities. The general licenses require a pre-April 6 agreement and reporting obligations at the conclusion of the license period.
March 29, 2018	The UK government proposed to maintain its cooperative relationship with the EU from a sanctions perspective, both formally and informally, post-Brexit.
March 19, 2018	The President issued EO 13827, Taking Additional Steps to Address the Situation in Venezuela, and OFAC made additional designations of Venezuelan persons in conjunction with the EO, which primarily addressed attempts by Venezuela to use the issuance of a digital currency to circumvent U.S. sanctions.
March 1, 2018	OFAC announced the amendment and reissuance of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 510, in order to implement EO 13687, EO 13722, and EO 13810, and to reference the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 and the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017. All property and interests in property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea are blocked, and U.S. Persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them without OFAC authorization.
February 26, 2018	The European Union (EU) increased its sanctions on the North Korean regime to align with UN Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017), including caps on refined petroleum products, bans on additional major categories of imports from and exports to North Korea, and additional maritime restrictive measures.
February 23, 2018	U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced additional sanctions measures against North Korea, targeting shipping and trade entities, and released a trade bulletin identifying sanctions circumvention strategies employed by North Korea.
January 26, 2018	The U.S. Government made redesignations and identifications of Russian individuals required by the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The Trump administration declined to further restrict Russian defense and intelligence entities already identified.
January 22, 2018	The EU added Venezuelan Government officials to its Venezuela sanctions list with Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/90, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/88.
December 21, 2017	The EU adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2426, to extend sanctions targeting Russian financial, energy and defense sectors until July 31, 2018. OFAC added five individuals to the Magnitsky Act list, bringing the total number of individuals blocked under the program to 49. The Magnitsky Act targets individuals connected to the detainment, torture, and death of a Russian lawyer-turned-whistleblower who exposed state fraud and corruption.

November 13, 2017	The EU adopted an arms embargo and the structure to implement asset freeze and travel-related sanctions on targeted individuals in the Venezuelan Government per Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074.
November 8, 2017	OFAC amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (CACR), to implement President Trump's June 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum regarding policy toward Cuba. The regulatory changes are intended to divert economic activities away from Cuban military, intelligence, and security services, but explicitly maintain opportunities for Americans to travel to Cuba and support private small business there.
October 31, 2017	In accordance with Section 223(d) of CAATSA, OFAC amended Directive 4 of its Sectoral Sanctions program. Directive 4 now prohibits the provision of goods, technology, and non-financial services to deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in any location where a listed entity has a 33% or greater ownership interest. The delayed effective date of this modification was January 29, 2018, and OFAC published new and updated FAQs relating to the amendment. Additionally, OFAC published new FAQs related to CAATSA Sections 223(a), 226, 228, and 233
October 24, 2017	OFAC issued Belarus General License 2D, extending the authorization to conduct business with certain state-controlled designated entities, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of State. The License expires April 30, 2018, unless extended.
October 16, 2017	The EU restated its commitment to the implementation of the JCPOA following President Trump's decision to not certify Iran's continuing compliance with the JCPOA.
October 12, 2017	The U.S. revoked certain Sudan and Government of Sudan sanctions, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13761, as amended by EO 13804. OFAC published new FAQs regarding this revocation, as well as a new general license authorizing certain transactions pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. This action does not affect OFAC sanctions related to the conflict in Darfur, which were imposed pursuant to EO 13400 pursuant to the national emergency declared in EO 13067.
September 29, 2017	The EU acted (Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775) to implement UN Resolution 2374 permitting sanctions with respect to those threatening Mali's peace agreement. OFAC amended Sectoral Sanction Directives 1 and 2 pursuant to Title II of CAATSA, with a delayed effective date of November 28, 2017. Among other changes, the amendments shortened the maturity window of Directive 1 debt to 14 days and Directive 2 debt to 60 days. OFAC also published updated FAQs relating to the amended Directives.
September 21, 2017	President Trump issued EO 13810 on September 20, 2017, imposing additional sanctions on North Korea following an escalation in regional tensions. The measures target banks and other financial institutions that enable the country's WMD capabilities. OFAC concurrently released new and updated FAQs along with new General License 10 and revised General License 3-A.

U.S. Checklist: Trade and Other Restrictions Affecting Foreign Countries

<p>Please note: This list is intended to alert users to possible issues involving transactions with the named countries. It is not intended to constitute, or substitute for, legal advice.</p>	Comprehensive Sanctions ¹	Trade Restrictions ²	Financial Sanctions ³	Specially Designated Nationals (Individuals and Organizations) ⁴	Anti-Boycott Concerns ⁵	Restricted Trade in Defense Articles/ Weapons ⁶
Country						
Afghanistan						X
Balkans (Western) (relating to former Yugoslavia)				X		
Belarus				X		X
Burma (Myanmar) ^a			X	X		X
Burundi				X		
Central African Republic				X		X
China				X		
Crimea ^b	X	X	X	X		X
Cuba ^c	X	X	X	X		
Cyprus						X
Democratic Republic of the Congo				X		X
Eritrea						X
Haiti						X
Iran ^d	X	X	X	X		X
Iraq				X	X	X
Kuwait					X	
Lebanon				X	X	X
Libya				X	X	X
Mali				X		
Nicaragua				X		
North Korea	X	X	X	X		X
People's Republic of China (PRC)						X
Qatar					X	
Russia ^b			X	X		X
Saudi Arabia					X	
Somalia				X		X
South Sudan				X		X
Sudan ^e						X
Syria	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ukraine ^b				X		
United Arab Emirates					X	
Venezuela ^f			X	X		X
Yemen				X	X	
Zimbabwe				X		X

U.S. Checklist footnotes and category summaries on pages 18-20.

EU Checklist: Trade and Other Restrictions Affecting Foreign Countries

<p>Please note: This list is intended to alert users to possible issues involving transactions with the named countries. It is not intended to constitute, or substitute for, legal advice.</p> <p>Country</p>	Broad Sanctions ¹	Trade/Investment Restrictions ²	Asset Freeze/Travel Restrictions ³	Arms & Related Materiel Embargo ⁴
Afghanistan		X	X	X
Belarus		X	X	X
Bosnia and Herzegovina			X	
Burma (Myanmar) ^a		X	X	X
Burundi			X	
Central African Republic		X	X	X
Crimea ^c		X	X	X
Democratic Republic of the Congo		X	X	X
Egypt			X	
Guinea (Republic of Guinea-Conakry)			X	
Guinea-Bissau			X	
Iran		X	X	X
Iraq		X	X	X
Lebanon			X	X
Libya		X	X	X
Mali ^a			X	
Nicaragua			X	
North Korea	X	X	X	X
People's Republic of China (PRC)				X
Russia ^c		X	X	X
Somalia		X	X	X
South Sudan			X	X
Sudan			X	X
Syria	X	X	X	X
Terrorist Groups (Foreign Terrorist Organizations) ^d		X	X	X
Tunisia			X	
Turkey			X	
Ukraine ^c			X	
Venezuela ^f		X	X	X
Yemen			X	X
Yugoslavia (former) ^e			X	
Zimbabwe ^b		X	X	X

EU Checklist footnotes and category summaries on pages 21-22.

U.S. Checklist – Further Information

U.S. Checklist Notes:

^{a/} After a period of sanctions easing, the U.S. has imposed new sanctions on Burma by issuing EO 14014 (February 10, 2021), following a military coup and violence against protesters in the country. The EO blocks all property in the possession of U.S. persons that belongs to designated persons operating in the Burmese defense sector, responsible for the coup or unrest in Burma, who are members of the Burmese government or security forces, or other persons materially assisting the foregoing. These individuals must be explicitly designated (i.e., listed by OFAC) in order to become blocked. The Department of Commerce has also tightened export controls pertaining to Burma, moving it to Country Group D:1 as of March 8, 2021. New investment with the Burmese Ministry of Defense and other armed groups, activities with certain sanctioned parties and importation of jadeite or rubies mined or extracted from Burma also remains prohibited. An interim final rule published on April 8, 2021 added Burma to the list of countries with military-intelligence-related controls. An exporter, reexporter, or transferor is requires a license if there is knowledge the item is destined for a military-intelligence end use or user in Burma.

^{b/} Since the issuance of Executive Order 13660 (March 6, 2014), Executive Order 13661 (March 17, 2014), and Executive Order 13662 (March 24, 2014), the U.S. has gradually extended sanctions against Russia because of its occupation of portions of Ukraine. The expanded sanctions include the designations of SDNs in both Russia and Ukraine, targeted trade restrictions against the Russian defense, banking, and energy industries, the targeting of certain Russian economic sectors for financial sanctions, and restrictions on new debt and equity. Executive Order 13685 (December 19, 2014) implements broad-based sanctions against the Crimea region of Ukraine. While we recognize that Crimea is not a country, it is included on this chart because of the nature of the sanctions that have been imposed. Congress's passage of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) on August 2, 2017 (PL No. 115-44), codified some earlier sanctions on sectors of the Russian economy and defense industries, and imposed additional economic measures on Russia, Iran, and North Korea. On March 2, 2021, the Department of State added Russia to the "Section 126.1" list, changing the license policy for most ITAR articles and services to a "presumption of denial". Exports, reexports, or transfers of goods subject to the EAR involving Russian military end uses or end users are also subject to additional restrictions. Although Russia is not subject to comprehensive sanctions,

CAATSA demonstrated strong congressional intent to punish Russia for election interference and keep many economic measures in place that affect the Russian economy.

^{c/} Cuba has been removed from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. On January 15, 2014, the U.S. amended the Cuban sanctions in order to allow certain travel under general licenses, encourage people-to-people contact via telecommunications, and to allow a very limited set of transactions between U.S. persons and Cuba. Additional relaxation by OFAC license and regulatory changes further permitted individual and business interaction with Cuban nationals. Further changes in 2015 and 2016 markedly eased OFAC's financial sanctions program for Cuba by permitting an expanded set of activities related to scientific collaboration, communication, travel, commerce with the Cuban people, transportation, financial transactions, and activities in other areas. However, the broad U.S. embargo against Cuba remains intact, and President Trump signaled a strong disinclination to continue rapprochement with Cuba, announcing revisions to the Cuba sanctions program that more closely restrict authorized individual travel to Cuba and permissible dealings with the Cuban government and military, intelligence, or security services as of November 2017. OFAC, BIS, and/or Department of State licenses for transactions in Cuba are still frequently required.

^{d/} On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced his decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and to reimpose U.S. nuclear-related sanctions lifted in 2016 to implement the accord. Following two consecutive 90-day wind-down periods (ending August 6, and November 4, 2018, respectively), the full reimposition of U.S. pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran occurred. Sanctions apply to certain transactions by foreign subsidiaries owned or controlled by a U.S. person. Public companies must disclose certain Iran-related activities in their annual and quarterly reports filed after February 6, 2013. The U.S. may sanction any person determined by OFAC to have assisted or supported certain entities of or activities by the Government of Iran, regardless of any involvement by U.S. persons ("secondary sanctions"). Congress's passage of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) on August 2, 2017 (PL No. 115-44), imposed additional economic measures on Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The Biden Administration has prioritized the re-engagement of all parties in the JCPOA framework, but no changes to U.S. sanctions reimposed by the Trump Administration have taken place as of the date of this publication.



^{e/} Effective July 9, 2011, the U.S. formally recognized the Republic of South Sudan as a sovereign state. Sanctions against Sudan were revoked pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13761, as amended by EO 13804. These actions authorized transactions with individuals and entities in Sudan and solidified the unblocked property involving the Government of Sudan. OFAC published new Frequently Asked Questions regarding this revocation, as well as a new General License authorizing certain transactions pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. This action does not affect OFAC sanctions related to the conflict in Darfur, which were imposed pursuant to EO 13400 pursuant to the national emergency declared in EO 13067. The controls that applied to Sudan until October 12, 2017, did not apply to the Republic of South Sudan. 76 Fed. Reg. 41046 (July 13, 2011). On June 28, 2018, OFAC announced the removal of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations. Sudan was removed from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism on December 14, 2020.

^{f/} On August 6, 2019, the Trump Administration issued a new Executive Order blocking property of the Government of Venezuela for U.S. persons. The new prohibition is a steep escalation of consequences on the Maduro regime's government, preventing U.S. companies and individuals from doing business with any government of Venezuela entity, official, or

any entity owned 50% or greater by the government. Exports, reexports, or transfers of goods subject to the EAR involving Venezuelan military end uses or end users are also subject to additional restrictions.

Summary of Categories:

¹ **Comprehensive Sanctions:** These countries are subject to far-reaching economic sanctions implemented by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"). The restrictions potentially affect nearly all dealings by U.S. persons in property of the listed countries, including limitations on imports, exports and financial transactions. Further information can be found at <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions>.

² **Trade Restrictions:** These countries are subject to relatively broad trade restrictions affecting exports, imports or both. These restrictions are not limited to strategic, dual-use or defense items but generally extend to nearly all goods.

³ **Financial Sanctions:** U.S. persons may not conduct financial transactions with these countries and their entities or within sectors of their economy. All of these restrictions are implemented by OFAC.

⁴ **Specially Designated Nationals (Individuals and Organizations):** U.S. persons are restricted in their ability to engage in transactions with specially designated nationals, or SDNs (a group that includes specified individuals and entities and vessels), wherever they may be located. The countries listed are those countries in which SDNs are specifically referenced. In addition to persons linked to these countries, the SDN list also includes individuals, entities and vessels, wherever located, that are regarded as terrorists, narcotics traffickers or proliferators of weapons of mass destruction or as contributing to these activities. An up-to-date list of SDNs is maintained by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. See <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions>.

⁵ **Anti-Boycott Concerns:** U.S. persons are subject to civil and criminal penalties, or in some cases to the denial of tax advantages, if they participate in foreign boycotts that the U.S. does not support. The foreign economic boycott that is of principal concern to U.S. companies is the Arab League boycott of Israel. The Department of the Treasury (Office of the International Tax Counsel/Tax Policy) publishes a quarterly list of "boycotting" countries, on which the named countries are found.

Restricted Trade in Defense Articles/Weapons:

The Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls ("DDTC") maintains a list of countries for which it has adopted specific policies—generally highly restrictive—relating to the export of defense articles and defense services. See https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_country_landing&spa=1&table=x_usd10_ddtc_publi_ddtc_public_country_policies&filter=&p=4&o=country&d=asc. These countries are also indicated as country group D:5 in The Export Administration Regulations ("EAR"), See 15 U.S.C. Part 740 Supp. 1; and are subject to restrictions with regard to the exportation of 600 series items.

Though there are no current embargoes on the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Guinea, DDTC has issued a "Notice to Exporters" for each country stating that license applications for the export of U.S. Munitions List (USML) items to these countries may be delayed and approval should not be assumed.

Additionally, DDTC issued a "Notice to Exporters" regarding the issuance of export licenses for major defense equipment (defined in 22 U.S.C. 2794(6)) to be exported to Pakistan. Currently, the issuance of licenses is prohibited absent an appropriate certification or waiver under Section 203 of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-73) in fiscal years 2012-14.

Non-Country Based Lists to Check:

The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") maintains links to several other lists, compiled by various U.S. government agencies, that can be checked prior to engaging in exports or re-exports. (See <http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/liststocheck.htm>) Among these are the following, all of which are compiled by the Department of Commerce and apply to specific individuals or entities:

- (1) The **Denied Persons List**, which includes individuals and entities that have been denied export privileges;
- (2) The **Unverified List**, which includes parties for which BIS has been unable to verify the end-user in prior transactions;
- (3) The **Entity List**, which includes parties whose presence in a transaction can trigger a license requirement under the Export Administration Regulations; and

- (4) The **Consolidated Screening List**, which combines export screening information from the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury.

Please note: This information is intended to alert users to possible issues involving transactions with the named countries. It is not intended to constitute, or substitute for, legal advice.

Trade with China

Growing Tension between the U.S. and China

Tensions between the U.S. and China have grown over recent years, with China becoming a top national security priority. The U.S. has tightened export control restrictions involving China and Chinese entities and imposed blocking sanctions on several Chinese entities and persons; responded swiftly to what it views as the Chinese government's erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy after the passage of China's 2020 National Security Law; and taken a number of steps to respond to human rights abuses occurring in certain portions of China, particularly affecting commerce involving the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. These actions, taken together, have significant ramifications for U.S. companies doing business in China or with Chinese entities.

Expansion of Military End Use/End User Rules

For companies exporting goods to China, Burma, Russia, or Venezuela, an important change took place with respect to products with military end uses or users on June 29, 2020. Military end use included direct uses, such as parts or components of weapons, as well as indirect uses, like those for maintenance or repair. After the June 29 changes, the definition of military end use was expanded to include "any item that supports or contributes to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, 'development' or 'production' of military items." The new definition could now capture any item tangentially related to military uses.

In addition, the rule was expanded to include military end users in China, in addition to military end uses. The definition of "military end user" encompasses not only the military and government organizations supporting the military, but also "any person or entity whose actions or functions are intended to support 'military end uses.'" 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(g). On top of these revisions, BIS changed the license review policy to a "presumption of denial" for most transactions involving military end use/end users in China, making it more difficult to obtain a license if needed. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(e).

EU Checklist – Further Information

EU Checklist Notes:

^{a/} The EU has agreed to suspend, in large part, sanctions issued in the past. This does not include Arms and Related Materiel (April 23, 2012).

^{b/} On 2/18/13, 3/27/13 and 2/13/14 the EU suspended most sanctions that freeze Zimbabwe's funds and economic resources and impose travel restrictions on certain individuals, entities and bodies. Nevertheless, some assets remain frozen and some individuals remain subject to travel restriction. The EU extended its remaining sanctions on Zimbabwe until February 20, 2021, per Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/224.

^{c/} Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014; Council Regulation (EU) 692/2014 of 26 June 2014; Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 (as amended); Council Regulation (EU) 960/2014 of 8 September 2014; Council Regulation (EU) 1351/2014 of 18 December 2014.

^{d/} The sanctioned persons include Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

^{e/} The EU lists the measures under current names of regions of the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. The restrictions apply only to specific individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.



^{f/} The EU adopted an arms embargo and the framework to implement sanctions on targeted individuals in the Venezuelan Government on November 13, 2017. The first addition of officials to the Venezuela sanctions list occurred January 22, 2018. See Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/90, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/88. To date the EU has listed over 30 persons in Venezuela for their anti-democratic actions pursuant to this program.

^{g/} The EU acted (Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775) to implement UN Resolution 2374 permitting sanctions with respect to those threatening Mali's peace agreement.

Summary of Categories:

¹ **Broad Sanctions:** This category generally does not encompass the same kind of comprehensive sanctions programs typically imposed by the U.S., which affect nearly all economic sanctions with the named country. Inclusion of a country here does indicate, however, that the EU has imposed a variety of restrictions on trade (including, but extending beyond, an arms embargo), dealings with certain named individuals or entities, and, sometimes, diplomatic sanctions.

² **Trade/Investment Restrictions:** This category may encompass restrictions on exports of certain types of services or technology, investment in particular sectors and imports of certain items. Generally the restrictions are more limited than those in the "Trade Restrictions" category in the U.S. checklist.

³ **Asset Freeze/Travel Restrictions:** The EU typically imposes a freeze of assets or restrictions on travel (admission) to the EU only with respect to specified individuals or entities. .

⁴ **Arms and Related Materiel Embargo:** The EU often imposes restrictions in this category in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions, as is the case with respect to Sudan.

Resource for EU Restrictions: <https://cutt.ly/Ir0liR0>.



Note regarding Germany:

Germany makes available extensive materials on its export control regime. (See web site reference below.) In addition to observing the EU-wide restrictions, it establishes special license requirements for export items that (1) are intended for conventional military end use and (2) are to be sent to a "Country List K" destination. The Country List K currently consists of Cuba and Syria.

Germany also requires specific authorization if (1) the export items are intended for use in a nuclear plant and (2) a purchasing country or destination is one of the following:

- | | |
|---------|-------------|
| Algeria | Jordan |
| India | Libya |
| Iran | North Korea |
| Iraq | Pakistan |
| Israel | Syria |

Resource for German Restrictions:

<https://cutt.ly/8r0lo2A>.

Note regarding Canada:

Canada typically imposes sanctions mandated by UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, although it is not an EU member, Canada often follows the EU in adopting non-UN based sanctions, such as those imposed on Belarus or Zimbabwe. It has not, however, followed the EU in adopting sanctions against Moldova.

Resource for Canadian restrictions:

<https://cutt.ly/br0lhzO>.

Russia/Ukraine: Canada has adopted sanctions against Russia that closely mirror those adopted by the U.S. and the EU.

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UK and "Brexit" from EU Sanctions

Following the end of the transition period for the UK's exit from the EU, as of January 1, 2021, the UK no longer implements EU sanctions as a matter of course. New UK sanctions regulations in force under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2018 establish autonomous UK sanctions regimes, applying to the entire UK. While similar to the previous EU sanctions structure, the new UK regime does not overlap perfectly with the EU's sanctions programs. The UK has defined sanctions program groups for 9 thematic categories (e.g., chemical weapons, terrorism, cyber activity, financial misappropriation, human rights, etc.) and 29 programs based on geographic territories.

The UK also maintains arms embargo, export controls, and other trade restrictions programs. For example, it requires specific authorization for the export of certain dual-use and military end-use items. The Export Control Joint Unit (UCJU) administers the UK's export control and licensing system.

Resources for UK Restrictions: <https://tinyurl.com/3h7k3cny>; <https://tinyurl.com/2phmd3rh>

UN Checklist – Security Council Mandated Sanctions

The UN Security Council can impose mandatory non-military sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in furtherance of its mission to maintain or restore international peace and security. While the substance of the relevant Security Council resolutions varies, all of the following countries and groups, except Lebanon, are currently subject to at least some restrictions on the supply of arms and related material; additional restrictions, including travel restrictions and asset freezes applicable to named individuals, may also apply.

- Central African Republic
- Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo)
- Guinea-Bissau
- Iraq
- Lebanon*
- Libya
- Mali
- North Korea
- Somalia
- South Sudan
- Sudan
- Yemen
- Terrorists (includes ISIL, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban)

*/Restrictions on individuals involved in the killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

Resource for UN sanctions: www.un.org/sc/committees

Asian Countries: Our research has found little information on country-based export control regimes currently available online, at least in English, from official Chinese or Japanese sources. By contrast, Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China, maintains an easily accessed list of restrictions it enforces against countries that are subject to UN sanctions. Hong Kong's list mirrors the UN checklist set forth above.

Resource for Hong Kong restrictions: <https://cutt.ly/Mr0lzEd>.

Singapore also publishes helpful information online. It sets forth the specific restrictions on various countries and persons it implements in accordance with UN sanctions. Singapore also supplies links to information on U.S., EU and Japanese restrictions under the title, "Unilateral Sanctioned Lists or Embargoes."

Resource for Singapore restrictions and links: <https://cutt.ly/Or0ljLk>.

South Africa: Although most of South Africa's official online governmental materials appear to be published in English, we have not found any specific discussion of economic sanctions. As a long-standing UN member, however, South Africa presumably implements mandatory economic sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. It should be noted that Zimbabwe—which is not currently subject to UN sanctions—raises special issues for South Africa, a neighboring country that has received numerous refugees from Zimbabwe. South Africa's current President, Jacob Zuma, has called for the lifting of sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe. The U.S., EU and Canada are among those imposing the sanctions.

A considerable amount of trade-related information (although not currently covering economic sanctions or similar trade restrictions) can be found at the web site of the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa: www.itac.org.za.

Australia: www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_sanctions/index.html

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The information provided herein is intended for general purposes only and is not intended to be legal advice. This document is not intended to be a compliance manual, nor is it intended to outline all of the requirements for an international trade compliance program. The distribution and release of this document does not establish an attorney-client relationship between the reader and Thompson Coburn LLP. The statutes and regulations referred to herein are subject to revision and amendment. Interpretations of the agencies and the courts of the United States must also be consulted to fully understand trade compliance issues. We suggest that parties involved in international trade consult with legal counsel regarding specific issues that may arise with their international transactions.

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